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Abstract 
 
Adrianne Nolan 
 “Shitting Medals”: L.I. Brezhnev, the Great Patriotic War, and the Failure of the 
Personality Cult, 1965-1982 
(Under the direction of Donald J. Raleigh) 
 
 This thesis explores the relationship between L.I. Brezhnev’s cult of personality 
and the memory of the Second World War in the Soviet Union.  By glorifying and 
falsifying Brezhnev’s record of wartime service, his personality cult placed him within 
the myth of the “Great Patriotic War,” which had become the historical anchor of Soviet 
regime legitimacy.  The General Secretary also used the memory of the war to bolster his 
other public personae, or “hero roles.”  Brezhnev’s war hero image, however, ultimately 
contributed to the failure of his personality cult.  Becoming increasingly overblown, this 
persona invited ridicule that undermined Brezhnev’s cult.  The consequences of this 
failure, moreover, potentially reach beyond the 1970s and 1980s.  The implosion of 
Brezhnev’s cult undermined not only his legitimacy but, by encouraging the 
desacralization of the leadership, may also have gravely damaged the legitimacy of the 
Soviet regime as a whole.   
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Introduction 
 
“In general, men judge more by sight than by touch. . . .  Everyone sees what you seem to 
be; few have direct experience of who you really are.  Those few will not dare speak out 
in the face of public opinion when that opinion is reinforced by the authority of the 
state.” 
– Niccolò Machiavelli, The Prince1 
 
“What would happen to a crocodile if he ate Brezhnev?” 
“He’d be shitting medals for weeks.” 
– Popular Soviet joke, c. 19812 
 
 In 1981, in honor of his seventy-fifth birthday, Leonid Brezhnev was awarded his 
sixth Order of Lenin, which was meant to commemorate, among other achievements, his 
“great personal contribution to the attainment of victory over the German-Fascist 
aggressors in the Great Patriotic War.”3  By this time, Brezhnev had accumulated so 
many awards, a great number of them for his alleged military service, that many Soviet 
citizens had begun to quip that his latest surgery was to have his chest expanded–it was 
                                                
Translations from Russian are my own, unless otherwise specified.  On a few tricky passages (humor is 
notoriously hard to translate), I was fortunate to have the assistance of Emily Baran and Ainsley Morse.  
When Russian words and phrases appear in the text or notes, I have used the Library of Congress 
transliteration system.  I have not altered the transliteration of Russian names in quotations from English-
language publications. 
 
 1 Niccolò Machiavelli, The Prince, edited and translated by David Wooton (Indianapolis & 
Cambridge: Hackett, 1995), 55. 
 
 2 Dora Shturman and Sergei Tiktin, eds., Sovetskii Soiuz v zerkale politicheskogo anekdota 
(Jerusalem: Express, 1987), 272.  Here is a variation on this:  “A airplane carrying Brezhnev crashed in the 
taiga.  The KGB searched for him for three days and didn’t find him.  Finally gathering all of the animals 
and birds of the forest, the KGB asks if any of them had seen Brezhnev.  Hare responds: “I didn’t see 
Brezhnev himself, but I did see Wolf crapping medals for three days!””  As related in Aleksandr Maisurian, 
Drugoi Brezhnev (Moscow: Vagruis, 2004), 452.  A variation involving a bear can be found in Iu. Borev, 
ed., XX vek v predaniakh i anekdotakh, vol. 4 (Khar’kov: Folio & Rostov-on-Don: Fenikhs, 1996), 333. 
 
 3 Spravka o nagradax Leonida Il’icha Brezhneva, in Vestnik Arkhiva Presidenta Rossiiskoi 
Federatsii (Moscow: Archive of the President of the Russian Federation, 2006), 205. 
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the only way he would have room to accommodate more medals.4  Indeed, by 1981 it 
seemed implausible that the General Secretary could make a significant personal 
contribution to anything, as he had been experiencing precipitous physical decline since 
his first stroke in 1974.  Rumored to have been afflicted with everything “from abscessed 
teeth, bursitis, gout, influenza, pneumonia to heart attack and . . . leukemia,” Brezhnev 
had become not only an object of pity and a target for black humor, but also a symbol of 
political decay.5  Regardless, “Dear Leonid Il’ich” would die a few months later the most 
highly decorated leader in Soviet history.  In less than a decade, the USSR would follow 
him to the grave. 
 As the above discussion illustrates, by the early 1980s, obvious and painful 
incongruities existed between Brezhnev’s public persona and his actual person.  The 
public Brezhnev, the core of his cult of personality, was a deliberate construction born of 
a pragmatic and fluid bid for legitimacy and a longstanding tradition of leader cults.6  In 
the USSR, personality cults held a vital place in political culture for both historical and 
contemporary reasons.  First, these cults were a legacy of prerevolutionary political 
                                                
 4 One version of this joke can be found in Algis Ruksenas, ed., Is That You Laughing, Comrade? 
The World’s Best Russian (Underground) Jokes (Secaucus, NJ: Citadel Press, 1986), 31. 
 
 5 “The Brezhnev Syndrome,” Time, 20 January 1975.  Dmitrii Volkogonov has also made this 
point.  He writes, “The General Secretary, with his [poor] physical and mental condition, became a symbol 
of the decay, ruin, and erosion of the system.” Dmitrii Volkogonov, Sem’ vozhdei: Galareia liderov SSSR, 
vol. 2 (Moscow: Novosti, 1995), 108. 
 
 6 For discussions of the personality cult as a traditional Soviet political tool, see Ian D. Thatcher, 
“Brezhnev as Leader,” in Brezhnev Reconsidered, edited by Edwin Bacon and Mark Sandle (Basingstoke 
& New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 29; Graeme Gill, “The Soviet Leader Cult: Reflections on the 
Structure of Leadership in the Soviet Union,” British Journal of Political Science 10 (April 1980): 167-86; 
Jan Plamper, “Introduction: Modern Personality Cults,” in Personality Cults in Stalinism/ Personenkulte im 
Stalinismus, edited by Jan Plamper and Klaus Heller (Göttingen: VR Unipress, 2004), 13-42; and Boris 
Korsch, “The Brezhnev Personality Cult–Continuity (The Librarian’s Point of View),” research paper no. 
65 (Marjorie Mayrock Center for Soviet and East European Research, Hebrew University of Jerusalem: 
Jerusalem, 1987).   
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tradition, stemming from the glorification of the tsar, the cults of saints and various 
popular figures, and the veneration of early revolutionary heroes.7  Also, characteristics 
of the Soviet leadership structure generated a need for these cults.  As Graeme J. Gill 
asserts, uncertainties surrounding the process of succession, as well as the lack of rules 
governing limits of authority and tenure, created a situation in which the Soviet leader 
was left to consolidate power and support by any and all means possible. “Unprotected 
by formal institutional supports,” Gill argues, the General Secretary sought “to make his 
symbolic position unassailable by projecting himself as the embodiment of the system’s 
fundamental legitimizing principles.”8  The personality cult thus served to attribute to the 
leader unique accomplishments and abilities that made it appear not only as though he 
should be allowed to rule, but also as though the country needed him to rule.9  Therefore, 
a given leader’s personality cult offers a window into the concerns of his own era, as well 
                                                
 7 Several scholars identify continuities between tsarist-era traditions and Soviet leader cults.  Nina 
Tumarkin argues that the tropes, rituals, and forms of Lenin’s cult of personality were rooted in 
prerevolutionary Russian culture.  Nina Tumarkin, Lenin Lives! The Lenin Cult in Soviet Russia 
(Cambridge & London: Harvard University Press, 1983), 207-51; and “Religion, Bolshevism, and the 
Origins of the Lenin Cult,” Russian Review 40 (Jan., 1981): 35-46.  Nikolai Ssorin-Chaikov and Olga 
Sosnina also see continuity between tsarist Russia and the Soviet Union in the practice of giving gifts to the 
leader.  Nikolai Ssorin-Chaikov and Olga Sosnina, “The Faculty of Useless Things: Gifts to Soviet 
Leaders,” in Plamper and Heller, eds., Personality Cults in Stalinism/Personenkulte im Stalinismus (see 
note 6), 277-300.  For detailed analysis of the tsarist-era traditions, see Richard S. Wortman, Scenarios of 
Power: Myth and Ceremony in Russian Monarchy, 2 vols. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995 & 
2000). 
 
 8 Gill, “The Soviet Leader Cult,” 179. 
 
 9 A leader cult is, in the broadest sense, the organized glorification of the state leader, which serves 
to legitimize his position and power.  Jan Plamper notes that the label “cult of personality,” meaning “god-
like glorification of a modern political leader with mass medial techniques and excessive popular worship 
for this leader,” has been “applied to a large number of historical examples, including the post-Stalin leader 
cults of Mao, Kim Il Sung, Fidel Castro, Hafiz Al-Assad, and Sadam Hussein.”  Plamper, “Modern 
Personality Cults,” 33.  Rees uses the leader cult concept to link Nazism, Fascism, and Soviet Communism, 
writing that in each of these cases, “The leader cults were part of an attempt both to create a new official 
political culture that overcame the deep divisions within the state, and to construct a new sense of 
nationhood, a new identity.”  Rees, “Leader Cults,” 17.  We must bear in mind, however, that the process 
of legitimation necessarily draws upon traditions, tropes, ideas, and, most importantly, political needs 
relevant to the leader’s specific time and place.  This means that there are vast differences between the cults 
of, for example, North Korea’s Kim Il Sung and Cuba’s Fidel Castro. 
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as a means of accessing imagery and myths persistently embraced by Soviet political 
culture.10 
 By investigating the structure and content of Brezhnev’s public persona, my essay 
offers some insights into the way this cult functioned and its impact on Soviet state and 
society.  Borrowing a concept from Robert C. Tucker, I identify the “hero roles” that 
                                                
 10 For studies of specific Soviet personality cults, see Tumarkin, Lenin Lives;  Robert C. Tucker, 
“The Rise of Stalin’s Personality Cult,” American Historical Review 84 (April 1979): 347-66;  Balázs 
Apor, Jan C. Behrends, Polly Jones, and E.A. Rees, eds., The Leader Cult in Communist Dictatorships: 
Stalin and the Eastern Bloc (Basingstoke & New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004); David Brandenburger, 
“Stalin as Symbol: A Case Study of the Personality Cult and its Construction,” in Stalin: A New History, 
eds. Sarah Davies and James Harris (Cambridge & New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 249-70.  
For work on the cults of Eastern European communist leaders, see Apor, et al., eds., The Leader Cult in 
Communist Dictatorships and Joseph Held, ed., The Cult of Power: Dictators in the Twentieth Century 
(Boulder: East European Monographs, 1983).  Many scholars of the Brezhnev years do address his cult of 
personality, although almost always with brevity. George W. Breslauer’s discussion of the cult is typical.  
He periodically mentions the image Brezhnev projected in the media but only once specifically references 
the “personality cult.”  George W. Breslauer, Khrushchev and Brezhnev as Leaders: Building Authority in 
Soviet Politics (London, Boston & Sydney: George Allen & Unwin, 1982), 189.  Breslauer also touches on 
the cult of Brezhnev in an earlier essay, George W. Breslauer, “The Twenty-fifth Congress: Domestic 
Issues,” in The Twenty-Fifth Congress of the CPSU: Assessment and Context, edited by Alexander Dallin 
(Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1977), 16.  A slightly more substantial discussion of Brezhnev’s cult 
can be found in journalist John Dornberg’s biography of Brezhnev.  John Dornberg, Brezhnev: The Masks 
of Power (New York: Basic Books, 1974), 237.  Later scholarship takes the topic more seriously, but still 
falls short of a satisfying characterization.  See Stephen E. Hanson, “The Brezhnev Era,” in The Cambridge 
History of Russia, vol. 3, edited by Ronald Grigor Suny  (Cambridge & New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2006), 309-14 and Ian D. Thatcher, “Brezhnev as Leader,” 29.  Two published (but somewhat 
idiosyncratic) works have been devoted at least in part to the Brezhnev cult.  Boris Korsch, a librarian, aims 
to prove the existence of the Brezhnev cult through an examination of the numbers of publications by and 
about Brezhnev, the size of their print runs, and the instructions given to librarians regarding these 
materials. Boris Korsch, “The Brezhnev Personality Cult,” 4.  Like Korsch, political scientist Graeme Gill 
asserts that the primary function of the leader cult was to create an aura of legitimacy around the ruler, 
which became necessary because of the gap between ideology and practice in the Soviet system.  
Approximately a quarter of Gill’s essay is dedicated to the cult of Brezhnev.  Gill, “The Soviet Leader 
Cult,” 167-86. While Russian-language authors do not always treat the cult in the same cursory fashion as 
Western scholars, they seem more intent on highlighting the ways in which it was built, rather than 
analyzing its content.  Dmitrii Volkogonov, for example, devotes several pages of his Sem’ vozhdei (Seven 
Leaders) to Brezhnev’s awards and autobiographies, as well as the flattery that other officials tended to 
heap upon him, but does not interrogate the imagery, tropes, and practices that constituted the cult.  
Volkogonov, Sem’ vozhdei, 66-79.  More recent Russian-language publications seem to be aimed primarily 
at challenging negative interpretations of Brezhnev and therefore frequently gloss over his cult or treat it as 
something out of the General Secretary’s control.  For example, in Drugoi Brezhnev  (The Other Brezhnev), 
Aleksandr Maisurian argues that Brezhnev asked other officials not to build a cult and was reluctant to 
wear many of his medals on a regular basis.  It seems unlikely, however, that the cult was created entirely 
without the General Secretary’s consent.  Maisurian, Drugoi Brezhnev, 422-57.  For a case study that 
highlights the importance of apparent modesty to certain personality cults, see Árpád von Klimó, “‘A Very 
Modest Man’: Béla Illés, or How to Make a Career through the Leader Cult,” in in Apor, et al., The Leader 
Cult in Communist Dictatorships (see note 10), 47-59.  Also see Tucker, “The Rise of Stalin’s Personality 
Cult,” 348 and 357. 
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comprised Brezhnev’s cultic persona, analyzing how these components worked 
together.11  Brezhnev primarily appeared in four roles: the great Leninist, the fighter for 
peace, the war hero, and the true son of the Soviet people.  These images not only 
supported each other conceptually, but each likewise offered unique ways for Brezhnev 
to connect himself to both the mythic past and political concerns of the 1970s.  I also 
offer a preliminary discussion of the public response to the cult and its consequences.  By 
focusing on the question of how the cult fared in the eyes of the Soviet populace, 
especially as Brezhnev’s health and abilities declined.  Owing to a lack of archival 
access, my essay is confined primarily to an analysis of the means by which the state 
broadcast the cultic Brezhnev to the public.  Thus, it is not meant to discuss either the 
internal workings of the various state and Party organs that played a role in the cult’s 
construction, or personal and professional interactions within the leadership.  Restricted 
to published sources, I draw on Brezhnev’s autobiographies, officially approved writings 
about Brezhnev, the Soviet press, post-Soviet Russian-language publications, and 
collections of Soviet-era jokes. Much of my source base spans the whole period of 
Brezhnev’s reign, from 1965 to 1982, although my discussion of reception relies on 
sources from after 1974, during the period of Brezhnev’s physical decline. 
                                                
 11 In Stalin as Revolutionary, Robert C. Tucker writes that Stalin’s “supreme aspiration was to be 
like Lenin, a hero in history.”  Accordingly, Stalin created a matrix of “hero-roles,” which corresponded to 
the emerging national mythology and his own psychological proclivities: “the Best Leninist,” “the Great 
Revolutionary,” “the Civil War Fighter,” “the Eminent Marxist-Leninist Theoretician,” and “the Builder of 
Socialism.”  Although this paper is not concerned with Brezhnev’s inner world, the idea of “hero-roles” 
remains relevant and useful because all subsequent leader cults adhere to this pattern.  The categories 
changed with the times, but the basic structure remained, as the leader played several interconnected parts, 
each of which illustrated specific reasons for his power and authority.  Robert C. Tucker, Stalin as 
Revolutionary, 1879-1929: A Study in History and Personality (New York: W.W. Norton & Co, 1973), xv 
and 462-87. 
 
One Man, Many Roles 
 Countless public celebrations–theatrical affairs covered extensively in the press–
marked the Brezhnev era. Overseeing massive fêtes in honor of, for example, the 
twentieth and thirtieth anniversaries of the Soviet victory over the Nazis (1965 and 1975), 
the fiftieth anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 (1967), the one-hundredth 
anniversary of Lenin’s birth (1970), and the sixtieth anniversary of the Soviet Armed 
Forces (1978), Brezhnev had unique opportunities to connect his image to key events in 
the Soviet past.  The state also exploited annual and semi-annual occasions. 12  Victory 
Day grew immensely in importance throughout the Brezhnev era, while the media paid 
increasingly immodest attention to the General Secretary’s major birthdays.  Press 
coverage of these events offers one point of entry into the cult of personality.  Journalists 
and state officials took these opportunities to heap praise upon “Dear Leonid Il’ich,” 
while Brezhnev’s speeches often dominated holiday issues of various newspapers.  I 
examine editions of Pravda, the main press organ of the Communist Party of the Soviet 
                                                
 12 Celebrations are discussed in virtually every work dealing with personality cults.  See, for 
example, Benno Ennker, “The Stalin Cult, Bolshevik Rule and Kremlin Interaction in the 1930s,” in Apor, 
et al., The Leader Cult in Communist Dictatorships (see note 10), 83-96.  Ennker traces the evolution of the 
Stalin cult, treating the leader’s birthdays as markers of change.  Also, for a study of public celebrations in 
general, which includes discussions of the cult of personality and political legitimacy, see Karen Petrone, 
Life Has Become More Joyous, Comrades: Celebrations in the Time of Stalin (Bloomington & 
Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2000).  Awards ceremonies generally receive less attention than 
other forms of cult-building.  It would be particularly interesting to examine this in terms of all of the 
postwar leaders, as it appears that the accumulation of medals and titles became increasingly important in 
this period.  For instance, it seems that N.S. Khrushchev’s cult was also built up with awards ceremonies.  
For one exception, see William Taubman, Khrushchev: The Man and his Era (New York & London: W.W. 
Norton & Co., 2003), 425 and 614.  For the press and the personality cult, see Jeffrey Brooks, Thank You 
Comrade Stalin! Soviet Public Culture from Revolution to Cold War (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 2000). 
 
  7 
Union, for Victory Day of each year from 1965 to 1982, New Year’s, Revolution Day 
(November 7), and May Day editions from odd-numbered years, coverage of Brezhnev’s 
most significant birthday celebrations (19 December 1966, 1976, and 1981), as well as 
issues devoted to relevant, one-time events, such as awards ceremonies in honor of the 
leader and Brezhnev’s death. More specifically, I analyze articles centered on the General 
Secretary and his accomplishments, in addition to speeches delivered by him or in his 
honor.  Through the language their authors use and the events on which they focus, such 
documents display the various hero roles ascribed to Brezhnev, as well as the ceremonies 
and acts used to “elevate” the General Secretary above his peers and competitors.13 
 Official biographies of the General Secretary, as well as his own ghostwritten 
“autobiographies,” serve a similar purpose.14  I examine two biographies–L.I. Brezhnev: 
kratkii biograficheskii ocherk (L.I. Brezhnev: A Short Biographical Sketch, 1976) and L.I. 
Brezhnev: Pages from his Life, 1982–and Brezhnev’s ghostwritten autobiographies (Little 
Land, 1978; The Virgin Lands, 1978; Reconstruction, 1978; and Memoirs, 1981), in 
addition to various pamphlets and books devoted to Brezhnev’s speeches and 
accomplishments.15  These sources provide a site for image construction, first of all, by 
                                                
 13 I borrow the concept of “elevation” from Richard Wortman.  A process of “elevation,” he 
argues, “lifted the sovereign [of Imperial Russia] into another realm where he or she displayed the superior 
qualities of being entitled to rule.”  “Elevation” was the result of an “intentional and often painstaking 
effort to present the ruler as supreme and to vest him or her with sacral qualities.”  This is analogous to the 
formation of personality cults in the Soviet Union, as the state intentionally created an aura of myth around 
the leader as a means of legitimizing his rule. Wortman, Scenarios of Power vol. 1, 4. 
 
 14 Today it is accepted that Brezhnev’s memoirs were ghostwritten. I will discuss the works as 
though Brezhnv produced them, as the authorial voice is intended to be his.  We must also bear in mind, 
however, that having a functionary actually write the works can be seen as part of the cult’s construction in 
and of itself.  For an interesting (but somewhat cagey) discussion of the process of the memoirs’ 
production, see Iakovlev, “Kak sozdavalis’ memuary Brezhneva,” in L.I. Brezhnev: Materialy k biografii, 
edited by Iurii Aksiutin (Moscow: Izdatel’stvo politicheskoi literatury, 1991), 288. 
 
 15 Institute of Marxism-Leninism, Leonid Il’ich Brezhnev: Kratkii biograficheskii ocherk, 3rd ed. 
(Moscow: Izdatel’stvo politicheskoi literatury, 1981); Academy of Sciences of the USSR, Leonid I. 
  8 
marking the leader’s prestige. In the Soviet Union, as Robert McNeal argues, “the 
anthology of a leader’s works remains an important symbol of status, even if the content 
of the writing is pedestrian.”16  Large print runs and numerous editions proved integral to 
this phenomenon, making the leader’s books ubiquitous in libraries, schools, and party 
offices.  Brezhnev’s memoirs, for example, enjoyed print runs in the millions, as well as 
appearances in the press. Moreover, in such biographical and autobiographical texts, we 
find a condensed presentation of General Secretary’s cultic persona, as well as a 
coherent–if somewhat fictionalized–narrative of his life and accomplishments.  As Balázs 
Apor writes,  
the biographies of the communist leaders could . . . be considered as cross-
sections of their own cults.  The biography was a summary or outline that 
contained the whole range of myths about the particular leader in a simplified, 
condensed form.  At the same time, it could also function as a guide to, or map of, 
the cult, from which one could gain a mastery of the symbols and language of the 
cult.17  
 
In other words, these texts present each aspect of the General Secretary’s personality, 
abilities, and accomplishments, without any other concerns getting in the way.  We can 
therefore use these sources to help us understand not only the components of Brezhnev’s 
                                                                                                                                            
Brezhnev: Pages from His Life, foreword by L.I. Brezhnev (Oxford & New York: Pergamon, 1982).  Each 
volume of Brezhnev’s memoirs was originally published individually and also run in the press.  
Throughout the rest of Brezhnev’s reign and in the first few years after his death, they were re-released in 
several editions.  I use L.I. Brezhnev, Vospominaniia, expanded 2nd ed. (Moscow: Izdatel’stvo politicheskoi 
literatury, 1983).  
 
 16 McNeal’s article focuses on Brezhnev’s collected speeches and articles, which were published 
in nine volumes throughout the 1970s.  This statement, however, holds for the leader’s autobiographies, as 
well (see note 17).  Robert H. McNeal, “Review: Brezhnev’s Collected Works,” Slavic Review 36 
(September 1977): 488-93.  Also concerning the importance of the leader’s writings, see Korsch, “The 
Brezhnev Personality Cult.” 
 
 17 Balázs Apor, “Leader in the Making: The Role of Biographies in Constructing the Cult of 
Mátyás Rákosi,” in Apor, et al., The Leader Cult in Communist Dictatorships (see note 10), 63-77. 
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public image, but also the logic of the cult: why these hero roles emerged and how 
Brezhnev’s various personae supported one another conceptually and rhetorically.  
 Defining the current leader as Lenin’s heir emerged as a central feature of all 
post-Lenin Soviet personality cults.18  Lenin’s own cult existed in part to legitimize 
Soviet rule and he became an icon for the state’s primary foundation story, the myth of 
the October Revolution.19  Stalin managed to cast himself as the legitimate successor to 
Lenin by exploiting and fictionalizing his personal relationship with the deceased leader, 
emphasizing the roles he allegedly played in the Revolution and Civil War, and by posing 
as a great Leninist theoretician and the continuer of Leninist policies.20  Having not 
known Lenin personally, Brezhnev focused especially on casting himself as Lenin’s 
ideological heir.   
 In particular, Brezhnev forged a connection to Lenin through the rhetoric of 
peace.  In his many speeches on world peace, Brezhnev persistently described his policies 
as “Leninist,” insisting that Lenin had established a tradition of pursuing peace and that 
he, Brezhnev, was carrying this out.  “Following the behests of the great Lenin,” he 
enlightened a crowd in Cuba, “the Soviet Union, its Communist Party and other socialist 
                                                
 18 Referring to the public portrayals of Stalin and Brezhnev as “composite images,” Graeme Gill 
argues that one of the most critical elements of the personality cult was the leader’s connection to Lenin.  
Gill, “The Soviet Leader Cult,” 167.  Similarly, Boris Korsch argues that Stalin and every subsequent 
Soviet leader created a cult meant to legitimize his rule by portraying him as the “only [updater] of 
Leninism.” thereby legitimizing their rule.  Korsch, “The Brezhnev Personality Cult,” 4. 
 
 19 Nina Tumarkin argues that, during his lifetime, Lenin became central to national lore, being cast 
as a genius, a kind liberator, and a fearless fighter for the needs of the peasant masses.  Lenin and his 
supposedly unique qualifications to rule the Soviet state became such integral parts of the regime’s 
legitimacy that a special organization was established after his death to immortalize his memory and 
thereby extend his legitimizing potential past the bounds of his natural life.  See Tumarkin, Lenin Lives, 64, 
185, and 207-51.  For an excellent study of the development of the myth of the October Revolution, see 
Fred Corney, Telling October: Memory and the Making of the Bolshevik Revolution (Ithaca & London: 
Cornell University Press, 2004).   
 
 20 Robert C. Tucker addresses this.  Tucker, Stalin as Revolutionary, xv and 462-87. 
 
  10 
countries and fraternal parties, together with all peace forces, are waging today a 
persistent struggle to banish for good wars of aggression from the life of mankind, a 
struggle for lasting peace.”21  State officials also made this connection.  When Brezhnev 
received the Lenin Peace Prize in 1973, one observed that the medal itself “bears a 
picture of Lenin, a profoundly symbolic fact, for Vladimir Ilyich Lenin laid the 
cornerstone of the peaceful foreign policy of the Soviet state which, right from the first 
days of existence, has been following the principles of peace and friendship between 
nations.”22  Similarly, the anonymous author of Pages from His Life connects Brezhnev’s 
work for peace to his Leninist credentials, asserting, “Brezhnev’s boundless loyalty to the 
communist ideals, the leading one being work and peace, along with his own tremendous, 
often difficult, combat experience, have made him an active champion and exponent of 
Lenin’s policy of peaceful coexistence.”23   
                                                
 21 Leonid Brezhnev, Speech at a Mass Rally in Havana, January 29, 1974, For the Triumph of 
Peace and Socialism: Documents of the Official and Friendly Visit of the CC CPSU General Secretary, L.I. 
Brezhnev, to the Republic of Cuba (Moscow: Novosti, 1974), 35.  For illustrative examples of this rhetoric, 
see: L.I. Brezhnev, Pravda, 9 May 1965, no. 129 (17081), 1-4; Pravda, 4 November 1967, no. 308 
(17990), 1-6; Pravda, 9 May 1975, no. 129 (20733), 1; Pravda, 19 December 1981, no. 353 (23149), 1-2. 
 
 22 Speech by Z.A. Malakhova, in Honouring an Outstanding Champion of Peace: On the Meeting 
at which the International Lenin Prize “For Strengthening Peace Among Peoples” was presented to L.I. 
Brezhnev, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, July 11, 1973 (Moscow: Novosti, 1973), 26.  
For comparable praise, also see “Delo oktiabria zhivet v svershcheniiakh partii i naroda,” Pravda, 7 
November 1973, no. 311 (20185), 1-2; Pravda, 8 November 1973, no. 312 (20186), 1; Pravda, 19 
December 1976, no. 354 (21323), 2; “Pobeda vo imia mira,” Pravda, 9 May 1978, no. 129 (21829), 2; 
“Radi mira!” Pravda, 17 December 1981, no. 351 (23147), 2; “Gorod plamennyx zor’,” Pravda, 18 
December 1981, no. 352 (23148), 3; Pravda, 19 December 1981, no. 353 (23149), 1-3; “Chuvstvo istorii,” 
Pravda, 20 December 1981, no. 354 (23150), 3. 
 
 23 Academy of Sciences, Pages from His Life, 116. In this vein, during Revolution Day 
celebrations, officials often lauded Brezhnev’s international visits.  See, for example, “Pod znamenem 
Lenina k novym pobedam kommunisticheskogo stroitel’stva,” Pravda, 7 November 1969, no. 311 (18724), 
2; Pravda, 6 November 1971, no. 310 (19453); Pravda, 7 November 1971, no. 311 (19454), 2 and 5; 
Pravda, 7 November 1973, no. 311 (20185), 2; “Po puti Oktiabria–k novym podedam dela kommunizma i 
mira,” Pravda, 7 November 1974, no. 311 (20550), 2.  For more systematic praise of Brezhnev’s meetings 
with foreign leaders (communist and non-communist), see Institute for Marxism-Leninism, Kratkii 
biograficheskii ocherk, 150-224 and Academy of Sciences, Pages from His Life, 112-221. 
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 In this way, Brezhnev’s alleged war record also provided a means by which the 
General Secretary could attempt to appear as Lenin’s heir.  Service in World War II gave 
him a role within the longstanding and very Leninist mission of “fighting for peace and 
communism,” while he forged an even stronger link by invoking Lenin’s name upon the 
receipt of his military decorations.24  Brezhnev’s war experience, he wanted the public to 
believe, gave him a special ability to promote “Leninist” policies.  In a speech 
commemorating the one-hundredth anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution, Brezhnev 
used the Second World War as an example of the “revolutionary internationalism” the 
state had inherited from Lenin.25   Praise from state officials sometimes echoed this 
reasoning.  As one of his countless birthday greetings stated, “Since the Great Lenin, 
history has not known such party and state leader [as Brezhnev],” going on to call up 
Brezhnev’s “enormous contribution to the defeat [razgrom] of fascism . . . in the name of 
                                                
 24 Brezhnev asserted, for example, upon his receipt of the Order of Victory, that his “guiding star” 
had always been “the great ideas of Lenin, the ideas of Communism.”  “Vruchenie tovarishchu L.I. 
Brezhnevu ordena “Pobedy”,” Pravda, 21 February 1978, no. 52 (21752), 1.   Also see, Pravda, 20 
December 1966, no, 354 (17671), 1; Pravda, 8 November 1971, no. 312 (19455), 1; Pravda, 20 December 
1978, no. 354 (22054), 1; L.I. Brezhnev, Speech in the Kremlin upon Receiving the Distinction of Marshal 
of the Soviet Union, in L.I. Brezhnev, Leninskim kursom, vol. 6, Rechi i stat’i (Moscow: Izdatel’stvo 
politicheskoi literarury, 1978), 20-21. 
 
 25 Pravda, 4 November 1967, no. 308 (17990), 5.  Also see, L.I. Brezhnev, “Velikaia pobeda 
sovetskogo naroda,” Pravda, 9 May 1965, no. 129 (17081), 1-4; Iu. Zhukov, “Uroki istorii,” Pravda, 9 
May 1970,  no. 129 (18907), 4.  Similarly, Brezhnev sometimes connected Lenin and the revolutionary 
tradition to the Second World War by giving out awards.  On Lenin’s one-hundredth birthday, for example, 
Brezhnev presented Kharkhov Oblast with an award commemorating the residents’ bravery in the Great 
Patriotic War. Pravda, 15 April 1970, no. 105 (18883), 1-2.  Brezhnev and other members of the leadership 
also frequently described the state’s foreign policy as “Leninist.”  This tied into Brezhnev’s “personal 
accomplishments” in the international arena, while often invoking the memory of the war or linking 
Lenin’s Decree on Peace with Brezhnev’s Peace Program.  See, for example, “Cerdechnye pozdravleniia L. 
I. Brezhnevu,” Pravda, 9 May 1973, no. 129 (20003), 1-2; “Po puti Oktiabria–k novym pobedam dela 
kommunizma i mira,” Pravda, 7 November 1974, no. 311 (20550), 2; L.I. Brezhnev, “Piat’desiat let 
velikikh pobed sotsializma,” Pravda, 4 November 1967, no. 308 (17990), 5; Pravda, 1 January 1971, no. 1 
(19144), 1; Pravda, 1 January 1977, no. 1 (21366), 4.  Brezhnev was also often cast as the continuer of the 
principles of Leninism upheld in the war.  See, for example, Pravda, 9 May 1971, no. 129 (19272), 1-2; 
Pravda, 8 November 1975, no. 312 (20916), 1; Pravda, 20 December 1981, no. 354 (23150), 1-2; L.I. 
Brezhnev, Speech in the Kremlin upon Receiving the Order of the October Revolution, Leninskim kursom, 
vol. 8, Rechi, privetstviia, stat’i (Moscow: Izdatel’stvo politicheskoi literarury, 1981), 566. 
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freedom and the independence of peoples.”26  Thus, as Brezhnev and others conjured up a 
mythologized event in which the General Secretary supposedly played a role–the Great 
Patriotic War–they used this experience to create an image of Brezhnev as a part of the 
state’s first foundation myth–the October Revolution–and a legitimate successor to the 
state’s founder.   
 Returning to Brezhnev’s rhetoric of peace, we can discern another of the General 
Secretary’s hero roles: the fighter for peace.27  This persona not only established a 
connection to Lenin, but also responded to contemporary political concerns and worked 
to make Brezhnev appear able and accomplished.   Throughout the late 1960s and the 
1970s, world events created a situation in which it was advantageous for Brezhnev to 
appear as a peacemaker.  For example, during the Vietnam War, Brezhnev took almost 
any opportunity to contrast “imperialist” America  with his own country, the superpower 
that worked for “all honest men and women who cherish peace, justice, freedom and 
independence of the peoples.”28  Additionally, while Brezhnev’s embrace of West 
                                                
 26 Birthday greeting from the Professional Unions of the USSR, Pravda, 19 December 1976, no. 
354 (21323), 2.  Also see coverage of Brezhnev’s 75th birthday in Pravda, 19 December 1981, no. 353 
(23149), 3. 
 
 27 “Outstanding fighter for peace” became one of Brezhnev’s most common monikers.  This 
phrase appeared frequently in the press and found its way into the titles of pamphlets dedicated to the 
General Secretary.  See “Prazdnik trudi i mira,” Pravda, 1 May 1973, no. 121 (19995); “Bortsu za mir, za 
idealy kommunizma,” Pravda, 9 May 1976, no. 130 (21099), 1; “Svet velikogo Oktiabria ozaraet put’ k 
kommunizmu,” Pravda, 6 November 1976, no. 311 (21280), 2. Also see Pravda’s coverage of Brezhnev’s 
seventieth and seventy-fifth birthdays.  Pravda, 18 December 1976, no. 353 (21322), 1-3; Pravda, 19 
December 1976, no. 354 (21323), 1-6 and 8; Pravda, 18 December 1981, No. 352 (23148); Pravda, 19 
December 1981, No. 353 (23149); Pravda, 20 December 1981, No. 354 (23150), 1-2 and 4-5.  Reportage 
on Brezhnev’s death reflects this praise. Pravda, 12 November 1982, no. 316 (23477).  A bibliography of 
Brezhnev’s writings used “outstanding fighter for peace and communism” in its title.  N.P. Maloletova and 
N.B. Iakimova, eds., Vydaiushchiisia borets za mir i kommunizm: K 75-letiiu so dnia rozhdeniia L.I. 
Brezhneva (Moscow: Kniga, 1981).   
 
 28 This quotation comes from a discussion of the US presence in Vietnam.  Statement of the 
Twenty-third Congress of the CPSU Concerning US Aggression in Vietnam, in 23rd Congress of the 
Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Moscow: Novosti, 1966), 428.  Peace and the struggle against 
“imperialism” are frequently linked in Brezhnev’s rhetoric.  One example of this is found in one of his 
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German Chancellor Willy Brandt’s moves to recognize postwar European borders and 
open relations with the East was almost certainly fueled by pragmatic concerns, such as 
national security and the possibility of creating new trade opportunities, he used this turn 
of events to present himself as an ideologically-driven “fighter for peace,” rather than an 
ambitious politician seeking economic and geopolitical benefits for his state.29   In the 
late 1970s and early 1980s, the “fighter for peace” trope also allowed Brezhnev to justify, 
to some extent, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.  The Soviet Union was not, according 
to Brezhnev, engaging in expansion or imperialism, rather it aimed to help the “people 
[narod] of Afghanistan” along the path to “conditions of peace and security,” that would 
                                                                                                                                            
addresses to the Twenty-fourth Congress of the CPSU.  He asserts, “Comrades, in the period under review, 
the Central Committee and the Soviet Government did their utmost to ensure peaceful conditions for 
communist construction in the USSR, to expose and frustrate action by the aggressive imperialist forces, 
and to defend socialism, and the freedom of peoples and peace.” L.I. Brezhnev, Report of the Central 
Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union to the 24th Congress of the CPSU, March 30, 1971, 
in 24th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union: Documents (Moscow: Novosti, 1971), 29.  
Foreign leaders engaged in similar rhetoric.  For example, in honor of Lenin’s 99th birthday, the First 
Secretary of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, asserted that he was “personally glad” that in the 
“efforts” of the previous year against “anti-socialist forces,” he had received the support of the CPSU and 
“personally [Brezhnev].”  This greeting appeared less than a year after Warsaw Pact forces invaded 
Czechoslovakia and crushed the Prague Spring.  Pravda, 22 April 1969, no. 122 (18525), 1.   
 
 29 As suggested above, the majority of the scholarship on Brezhnev era foreign policy was written 
by political scientists either during Brezhnev’s life or shortly after his death.  Consequently, it is often 
aimed at offering suggestions for future United States policy, rather than at drawing conclusions about the 
motivations and larger significance of the Brezhnev government’s policies.  See, for example, Seweryn 
Bialer, ed., The Domestic Context of Soviet Foreign Policy (Boulder, CO: Westview Press; London: Croom 
Helm, 1981).  Fresh perspectives are now being offered by scholars such as Mike Bowker who argues that 
Brezhnev sought a number of goals in his pursuit of détente, including economic benefit from trade, the 
recognition of the Soviet Union as a superpower, to preempt a Sino-American alliance, and to discourage 
instability in the Eastern bloc.  Mike Bowker, “Brezhnev and Superpower Relations,” in Bacon & Sandler, 
eds., Brezhnev Reconsidered (see note 6), 90-109.  A recent work by Matthew J. Ouimet also discusses 
Brezhnev’s foreign policy, focusing specifically on the long-term effects of the “Brezhnev Doctrine” upon 
Soviet domestic and foreign policies.  He traces the reforms of the mid-1980s back to the economic 
pressures and increasing military expenditure of the Brezhnev era, arguing that these factors made it 
unfeasible for the USSR to continue to put down rebellions in Eastern Europe after the Prague Spring and 
the emergence of the Polish Solidarity movement.  Matthew J. Ouimet, The Rise and Fall of the Brezhnev 
Doctrine in Soviet Foreign Policy (Chapel Hill & London: University of North Carolina Press, 2003). 
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“answer the interests of every state and every people of that region of the world,” thereby 
also furthering “international détente as a whole.”30 
 Another strength of this hero role was the fact that it was not entirely 
manufactured.  Many Western leaders did have genuine esteem for Leonid Brezhnev and 
his foreign policy, regardless of whether or not they were wary of his obvious ambition.31  
He had unprecedented contact with leading politicians across the world, developing 
professional, if not cordial, relationships with Indira Gandhi, Willy Brandt, and several 
United States presidents.  He signed numerous treaties and accords, furthering 
international détente, finalizing postwar European borders, and making groundbreaking 
(although, in some cases, superficial) agreements on restricting arms buildup.  In Ian 
Thatcher’s words, “Foreign statesmen found in Brezhnev a leader with whom they could 
do business.”32  Indeed, if we look at earlier personality cults, we see quite easily that 
there was necessarily some truth woven into the web of exaggeration and fabrication.  
Lenin really did play a crucial role in the October Revolution; Stalin really was in charge 
when the Third Reich crumbled; Brezhnev really did score some successes in 
international relations.  The peace-fighter image represents one way in which this cult 
was rooted, to some degree, in reality. 
                                                
 30  L.I. Brezhnev, Speech at the Meeting of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, 
April 20, 1979, Leninskim kursom, vol. 8 (see note 25), 23. 
 
 31  Richard M. Nixon, for example, said of Brezhnev, “He was not a madman.  He was a realist. If 
an opponent showed weakness, Brezhnev would take every possible advantage, without scruple. But when 
met with firmness, he would compromise. He wanted the world. But he did not want war.”  Richard M. 
Nixon, as quoted in David Shribman, “3 Ex-U.S. Presidents Assert Death Marks End of an Era,” New York 
Times 12 November 1982. 
 
 32 Thatcher, “Brezhnev as Leader,” 26. 
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 Brezhnev’s war hero role also found its basis, albeit somewhat more loosely, in 
fact.  He had served as a political officer throughout the war, although not necessarily in 
such a distinguished manner as his slew of awards may lead one to believe.  Before his 
rise to power in the mid-1960s, Brezhnev possessed only four military decorations; yes, 
he served, but not remarkably.  By his seventy-fifth birthday in 1981, however, Brezhnev 
possessed a mountain of additional medals, and had also become a Marshal of the Soviet 
Union, a rank enjoyed by only a small elite of military leaders.  As the cult matured 
during the late 1970s and the first years of the 1980s, officials, writers, and journalists 
frequently praised Brezhnev’s alleged war service, making it a ubiquitous theme at state 
celebrations, especially on Victory Day.33  In response to the laudations and awards 
heaped upon the ailing General Secretary, Soviet citizens often joked that the only reason 
Brezhnev did not become Generalissimo–the highest military rank and the one taken by 
Stalin at the end of the war–was because he could not pronounce the word.34   
 Brezhnev’s major state-sponsored biography, A Short Biographical Sketch, offers 
the official master narrative of his wartime service, also fleshing out the qualities he 
                                                
 33 The Battle of Malaia Zemlia at Novorossiisk, a relatively minor event in the war, became the 
focal point of much of this praise and the topic of one of Brezhnev’s memoirs, Malaia zemlia.  L.I. 
Brezhnev, “Malaia zemlia,” in L.I. Brezhnev, Vospominaniia (see note 15), 41-85.  Boris Korsch offers a 
good overview of the rapturous praise that Malaia zemlia received in the press following its 1978 
publication.  Korsch, “The Brezhnev Personality Cult,” 30-33.  The state-approved narrative of Brezhnev’s 
supposedly heroic service can also be found in Academy of Sciences, Pages from His Life, 17-55 and 
Institute for Marxism-Leninism, Kratkii biograficheskii ocherk, 11-30.  For illustrative examples of this in 
the press, see “Muzhestvo desantnikov,” Pravda, 8 May 1965, no. 128 (17080), 3; Pravda, 19 December 
1966, no. 353 (17670), 1; Pravda, 20 December 1966, no. 354 (17671), 1; Pravda, 1 May 1973, no. 121 
(19995), 3; Pravda, 9 May 1975, no. 129 (20733), 2-3; Pravda, 19 December 1976, no. 354 (21323), 1; 
“Zemlia malaia i bol’shaia,” Pravda, 16 February 1978, 2; “Frontovye vstrechi,” Pravda, 10 February 
1978, no. 51 (21751), 2; Pravda, 21 February 1978, no. 52 (21752), 1; “Vysokii rubezh istorii,” Pravda, 9 
May 1979, no. 129 (22194), 2; “Narod-geroi, narod-bogatyr’,” Pravda, 9 May 1980, no. 130 (22560), 2; 
“Uroki velikoi pobedy,” Pravda, 9 May 1981, no. 129 (22925), 2; “Gorod plamennyx zor’,” Pravda, 18 
December 1981, no. 352 (23148), 3; Pravda, 12 November 1982, no. 316 (23477), 1-3. 
 
 34 Versions of this joke can be found in Anatolii Shepievker, Smekh vopreki vsemu: 100 russkikh 
anekdotov (Self-published, 1982), 27 and Borev, XX vek, 331. 
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allegedly displayed in battle.  As emphasized throughout this text, his persistent desire to 
act and serve ensured that “many glorious pages of the history of the war are connected 
with the name, Leonid Il’ich Brezhnev.”35  Indeed, according to his biographer, the 
young political officer was not satisfied unless he was in the midst of battle with his men, 
dodging bullets and leading charges.  Adored by his subordinates, Brezhnev raised their 
morale, showered them with wise words, and stood shoulder-to-shoulder with them in the 
heat of battle.  More than a brave, dynamic leader, the future General Secretary also 
promoted correct ideology and brought new Party members into the fold.  As A Short 
Biographical Sketch informs us, wherever Brezhnev served, “the more tense the battle 
conditions became, the more actively people joined the party.”36  Brezhnev was, so we 
are told, indispensable as a warrior and a political leader. 
 Several factors may have driven Brezhnev to choose this particular hero role for 
himself.  First of all, both tsarist-era and Bolshevik revolutionary traditions offered 
rhetoric that fed the creation of Brezhnev’s war hero persona.  Prior even to the February 
Revolution, the Russian underground possessed, according Orlando Figes and Boris 
Kolonitskii, “a huge illegal literature of hagiographies, histories and legends, broadsides 
and prints, celebrating the exploits of” countless revolutionary heroes and martyrs. 37  
Later, the “freedom fighter” (borets za svobodu) became the soldier-hero of the 
revolution and Civil War.  Stalin’s cult of personality, for example, made extensive use 
of this trope.  As Robert Tucker writes in his pioneering work, Stalin as Revolutionary, 
                                                
 35 Institute of Marxism-Leninism, Kratkii biograficheskii ocherk, 13. 
 
 36 Ibid., 20. 
 
 37 Orlando Figes and Boris Kolonitskii, Interpreting the Russian Revolution: The Language and 
Symbols of 1917 (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1999), 74. 
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“the events in which Stalin had participated became the decisive ones of the war.  He 
emerged in the center of the historical picture, by Lenin’s side, as the great front-line 
organizer of victory, the outstanding Civil War hero on the Red side.”38  Like Brezhnev, 
Stalin had been a political officer and, also like Brezhnev, it is highly debatable whether 
he was as indispensable as later portrayed.   
 Celebrating his war record also–and this is an essential point–allowed Brezhnev 
to root his public image in an indispensable national myth.  During the late 1940s and 
beyond, the “Great Patriotic War” became the USSR’s central foundation story, 
displacing the increasingly remote myth of the October Revolution.39  Through 
educational programs, mass media, and enormous celebrations, the state promoted a 
glossy master narrative of the war.40  This development allowed the present generation of 
leaders, who were by and large too young to have participated in the Revolution and Civil 
War, to develop a system of legitimization based on legendary service to the state and 
people, while potentially overriding undesirable class origins.  For most Soviet adults, 
moreover, the Second World War existed as important shared experience–even those who 
did not serve on the front had been involved in the war effort in some capacity, and all 
                                                
 38 Tucker, Stalin as Revolutionary, 478. 
 
 39 I base my discussion of the cult of World War II on the works of Amir Weiner and Nina 
Tumarkin.  Both argue that this story superseded the Revolution as the state’s primary foundational myth.  
Nina Tumarkin, The Living and the Dead: The Rise and Fall of the Cult of World War II in Russia (New 
York: Basic Books, 1994) and Amir Weiner, Making Sense of War: The Second World War and the Fate of 
the Bolshevik Revolution (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2001). In his study of the 
myth of the October Revolution, Fred Corney argues that the Soviet Union had an especial need for 
legitimacy tales, as it engaged in a “protracted battle with the West over its perceived legitimacy.”  One 
might add that the Soviet Union later faced increasingly bold domestic political dissent, another factor that 
likely reinforced the necessity of foundation myths.  Corney, Telling October, 4. 
  
 40 Nina Tumarkin discusses educational programs aimed at instilling patriotism in the Soviet youth 
in Tumarkin, The Living and the Dead, 150-57.  Regarding films that propagated the war myth, see Denise 
J. Youngblood, Russian War Films: On the Cinema Front, 1914-2005 (Lawrence: University of Kansas 
Press, 2007), 158-93. 
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remembered not only the sorrows of battle, but the joys of victory.  The war thus 
provided a historical anchor for Brezhnev’s cult, a familiar point of reference and a 
meaningful narrative for those meant to embrace the leader’s image and policies. Finally, 
the cult of the Great Patriotic War also gave the state a means by which it could try to 
instill patriotism and revolutionary fervor in disaffected Soviet youth, competing ever 
more intensely with Western popular culture for their hearts and minds.41 
 Brezhnev’s cult needed to make thorough use of this new story because cults of 
heroic national deeds not only legitimized the system as a whole, but also provided a 
conceptual foundation and a system of imagery for the cult of the leader.  Reinstated as a 
national holiday in 1965, the twentieth anniversary celebrations of the end of World War 
II (Victory Day, May 9) marked the beginnings of both Brezhnev’s inflation of the myth 
of the Great Patriotic War and his slow consolidation of personal power.  As Nina 
Tumarkin demonstrates in The Living and the Dead, Brezhnev reveled in the cult of the 
Great Patriotic War, manipulating it and inflating it to suit his goals. The General 
Secretary’s intent was not, however, simply to foster patriotism or turn Soviet youth 
away from Western popular culture, as Tumarkin argues; he also sought to legitimize his 
position and power.  War service had become a vital marker of loyalty to the state and of 
revolutionary fervor, so, presumably, the more impressive his war service was, the more 
fit he was to lead. 
                                                
 41 Nina Tumarkin addresses the aims of the war cult in The Living and the Dead, especially 133.  
John Bushnell argues that Soviet youth were increasingly influenced by Western popular culture 
throughout the 1970s and 1980s, demonstrating this by examining graffiti appearing throughout Moscow 
during this period.  John Bushnell, Moscow Graffiti: Language and Subculture (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 
1990).  Although not concerned exclusively with youth, Richard Stites also maintains that the Brezhnev era 
was marked by a cultural “malaise,” which eventually gave rise to “culture wars about the airing of such 
themes as sex and politics and the inflow of Western styles and fashion.”  Richard Stites, Russian Popular 
Culture: Entertainment and Society since 1900 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 149. 
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 Brezhnev may also have adopted the war hero image in part because of his tastes 
and sentiment.  Discussions of personal motives are necessarily tentative, but there is 
evidence that Brezhnev adored the military in general and the Great Patriotic War in 
particular.  Those close to Brezhnev wrote about his “passion for awards” and the joy he 
took in meeting with other veterans.42  According to his son-in-law, Yurii Churbanov, 
Leonid Il’ich loved war films and “patriotic military songs,” and always kept in touch 
with his “comrades from the war.”43  Similarly, Brezhnev’s niece, Liubov’ Brezhneva, 
asserts that at the end of his life the closest person to the General Secretary was his chief 
bodyguard, “a man who had been with him at the front lines in World War II.”44 
 The narrative of war further bolstered Brezhnev’s legitimacy by offering a site for 
the creation of another persona: the true son of the Soviet people.  Brezhnev’s memoirs 
proved vital to this project.  Brezhnev emphasizes not only his proletarian background, 
but also his enduring connection to the working class, particularly those workers who 
selflessly fought for the motherland.  In Little Land, he recounts his numerous warm 
interactions with his subordinates, thereby reminding the reader of how vital it is for an 
officer “to be there with the soldiers in the most difficult moment, to suffer the same 
danger.”45   Similarly, in the words of one biographer, Brezhnev “lived the life of his 
                                                
 42 Yurii Churbanov, Brezhnev’s son-in-law, coined the phrase “passion for awards (strast’ k 
nagradam).”  Yurii Churbanov, Moi test’ Leonid Brezhnev (Moscow: Algoritm, 2007), 132. 
 
 43 Ibid., 98-99. 
 
 44 Luba Brezhneva, The World I Left Behind: Pieces of the Past, translated by Geoffrey Polk (New 
York: Random House, 1995), 361.  Although originally published in English translation, Brezhneva’s 
autobiography was later released in Russia as Plemiannitsa Genseka (Moscow: Tsentrpoligraf, 1999). 
 
 45 Brezhnev, “Malaia zemlia,” 61. 
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people, and when the people had to go to war, he became a soldier, too.”46  Brezhnev 
proved a “true son of the Soviet people,” not only through his humble beginnings and 
selfless service to the nation, but also through his faithfulness to his class origins and the 
cause of communism.  He been born into the working class and he never ceased to be a 
worker at heart, even when he became the nation’s leader.  As a photo exhibit dedicated 
to his seventieth birthday proclaimed, Brezhnev was “Always with the Party . . . Always 
with the People.”47 
 Stepping back from these individual personae, we may begin to see how they fit 
together, thereby identifying the logic of Brezhnev’s personality cult.  First, Brezhnev 
needed the cult to create links between himself and the state’s foundational myths.  It was 
not sufficient to simply make himself central to the memory of the October Revolution 
and November 7 celebrations, invoking Lenin’s name at every possible opportunity, since 
he had been too young to have taken part in events or to have had personal interactions 
with Lenin.  Instead, he cast himself as Lenin’s ideological heir.  Brezhnev used his 
alleged wartime experience to legitimize his rhetoric of peace, which, in turn, validated 
his claim to Lenin’s mantle.  Brezhnev inflated the emerging myth of the Great Patriotic 
War, moreover, in an attempt to make it central to national legitimacy, as this was the 
foundation narrative in which he could play a role. 
 Connecting to these myths, moreover, allowed Brezhnev’s cult to harness already 
existing rhetoric and imagery.  The cult evolved as Brezhnev shaped his public image 
                                                
 46 This quotation comes from the English-language publication, Academy of Sciences, Pages from 
His Life, 54.   In this vein, Brezhnev casts his autobiographies as tales about the “heroism of the Soviet 
people,” rather than mere memoirs.  L.I. Brezhnev, Predislovie k Brazilskomu izdaniiu trilogii “Malaia 
zemlia,” “Vozrozhdenie,” “Tselina,” in L.I. Brezhnev, Leniniskim Kursom, vol. 8 (see note 25), 385. 
 
 47 A photo of this exhibition can be found in Pravda, 19 December 1976, no. 354 (21323), 8. 
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with the tools at hand, but these changes were more in form than in content.  During the 
early years of his rule, Brezhnev enjoyed undeserved recognition for his war service and 
a prominent place in state celebrations, but his public image was not ubiquitous.  The 
laudations heaped upon him in these years seem amorphous when compared to what 
came later, but they already embodied the major themes of the personality cult: Brezhnev 
was a true communist, a war hero, and a peacemaker.48 Over time, as he consolidated his 
power, amassed real accomplishments–such as numerous meetings and summits with 
foreign leaders from the East and the West–and dominated countless state anniversaries, 
Brezhnev received ever more extravagant praise. By the mid-1970s, other officials 
quoted Brezhnev almost as often as they quoted Lenin, and floods of books supposedly 
authored by the General Secretary swept into schools, bookshops, and libraries.  Also, the 
vague accolades of the late 1960s had hardened into recognizable (though unofficial) 
titles: “a great continuer of Lenin’s cause,” “an outstanding fighter for peace,” a “true son 
of the Soviet people.” 49  The cult’s thematically consistent nature, however, may have 
simultaneously worked for and against the cult’s success.  On one hand, Brezhnev had 
many years to hone his image, fine tuning the connections between his persona and the 
real past, as well as the ways in which the various elements of the cult worked together.  
On the other hand, as I demonstrate below, refusing to curtail a component of the cult that 
                                                
 48 Pravda’s coverage of Brezhnev’s sixtieth birthday illustrates this type of praise.  See Pravda, 19 
December 1966, no. 353 (17670). 
 
 49 See, for example, Pravda’s coverage of Brezhnev’s seventieth and seventy-fifth birthdays.  
Pravda, 18 December 1976, no. 353 (21322), 1-3; Pravda, 19 December 1976, no. 354 (21323), 1-6 and 8; 
Pravda, 17 December 1981, No. 351 (23147); Pravda, 18 December 1981, No. 352 (23148); Pravda, 19 
December 1981, No. 353 (23149); Pravda, 20 December 1981, No. 354 (23150), 1-2 and 4-5; Pravda, 21 
December 1981, No. 355 (23151), 4-5; Pravda, 22 December 1981, No. 356 (23152), 4; Pravda, 23 
December 1981, No. 357 (23153), 4. 
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the public received poorly could have damaged the aura of legitimacy Brezhnev sought to 
create. 
 Returning to the utility of the cult’s tropes, we see that the General Secretary’s 
personae built a bridge between reality and fiction.  Both the fighter for peace and war 
hero personas found their roots, to a certain extent, in fact; again, however, Brezhnev’s 
war record is the key to the cult’s logic.  Brezhnev had served in the war and, for better or 
worse, he proved to be the Soviet leader most actively engaged with foreign powers both 
East and West.  Having been cast in the crucible of the personality cult, these two facts 
became inextricably linked.  While “Dear Leonid Il’ich” sold his foreign policy at home 
and abroad wrapped in peace rhetoric, he invariably couched his claims to expertise on 
matters such as “international friendship” in terms of his wartime experience.  The Great 
Patriotic War, Brezhnev told the world, taught him the true costs of war and, thereby, the 
true value of peace.50  He even justified the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia in terms of 
peace and the memory of the war.  Speaking to a delegation of Czechoslovak communist 
party officials in October 1968, Brezhnev stressed the importance of the Great Patriotic 
                                                
 50 For this line of reasoning, see, for example, “Velikii podvig Sovetskogo naroda,” Pravda 9 May 
1970, 3;  Pravda 1 May 1977, no. 121 (21456), 1; “Zemlia malaia I bol’shaia,” Pravda 16 February 1978, 
no. 47 (21747), 2; “Frontovye vstrechi,” Pravda 10 February 1978, no. 51 (21751), 2; Academy of 
Sciences, Pages from His Life, 55 and116.  On seemingly unlikely occasions, Brezhnev sometimes 
managed to invoke the memory of the war as a reminder of the importance of peace.  See, for example, the 
coverage of his visit to a factory in honor of May Day 1976 in Pravda, 1 May 1976, no. 122 (21091), 2.  
Also see Brezhnev’s speech in honor of Soviet scientists in Pravda, 8 October 1975, no. 281 (20885), 2.  
On or near Victory Day, Brezhnev and other members of the leadership invoked the “struggle for peace,” 
highlighting the General Secretary’s role in it.  They thereby cast the Great Patriotic War in terms of peace, 
while also using the war to legitimize current foreign policy.  For a particularly illustrative example, see 
Pravda’s coverage of Brezhnev’s involvement in the international meeting, “Za ukreplenie mira mezhdu 
narodami” in  Pravda, 1 May 1973, no. 121 (19995), 1-4.; Pravda, 2 May 1973, no. 122 (19996), 4; 
Pravda, 9 May 1973, no. 129 (20003), 1-4.  This conference had taken place in April, but Pravda only 
provided an extensive treatment of this event several weeks later, in honor of May Day and Victory Day.  
On 10 May 1975, Pravda published an article celebrating international reactions to Brezhnev’s Victory 
Day speech, which offers extensive praise for his efforts in the “struggle for peace.” Pravda, 10 May 1975, 
no. 130 (20734), 4.   Also see, Pravda, 7 May 1965, no. 127 (17097), 2; Pravda, 8 May 1965, no. 128 
(17080); Pravda, 9 May 1973, no. 129 (20003), 1-4; Pravda, 9 May 1981, no. 129 (22925), 1. 
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War in forging unbreakable bonds between the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia, 
countries that together would carry on the “struggles” against imperialism and for 
peace.51 
 These personae worked together, reinforcing and legitimizing one another, for 
each role depended in large part upon Brezhnev’s status as a war hero.  Officials praised 
the General Secretary as a “true son of the working class” for marching “with the Soviet 
people down the difficult path of struggle and victory.”52  Moreover, Brezhnev’s claims 
to being a Great Leninist required that Brezhnev appear to have been instrumental to 
Soviet successes in World War II, as this cast him in the ongoing drama, “fighting for 
peace and communism.”  Brezhnev also could not appear as an heir to Lenin without his 
rhetoric of peace, which, in turn, depended on the invocation of Brezhnev’s war record 
for validation.   
 In this vein, he declared on the twentieth anniversary of the Soviet victory in the 
Second World War, “We have done and are doing everything to prevent a new world 
war.  We truly remember those who died for the freedom of the socialist Fatherland. . . . 
Our foreign policy is clear.  Its goal: to guarantee . . . the conditions for building 
communism in [socialist] countries and to defend the cause of peace and progress.”53  
Similarly, Brezhnev’s larger image as a fighter for peace relied heavily on Brezhnev’s 
                                                
 51 L.I. Brezhnev, Speech at the Meeting of Soviet-Czechoslovak Friendship, 27 October 1968, in 
L.I. Brezhnev, Leninskim kursom, vol. 2, Rechi i stat’i (Moscow: Izdatel’stvo politicheskoi literatury, 
1970), 471-85.  In honor of Victory Day 1975, A.P. Kirilenko praised Brezhnev’s role in the liberation of 
Czechoslovakia during World War II, connecting this to the General Secretary’s role in strengthening post-
war Czech-Soviet friendship. Pravda, 8 May 1975, no. 128 (20732), 4. 
 
 52 Pravda, 19 December 1976, no. 354 (21323), 2. 
 
 53 L.I. Brezhnev, “Velikaia pobeda Sovetskogo naroda,” Pravda 9 May 1965, no. 129 (17081), 1-
4. 
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image as a battle-weary veteran. In 1981, on the occasion of his seventy-fifth birthday, 
one of the General Secretary’s many well-wishers gushed, “You became a Communist 
during the heroic time when the Soviet people selflessly struggled . . . for the gains of the 
Great October [Revolution]. . . . The Soviet people and the workers of all countries 
remember that you lived through the . . . ordeal of the Great Patriotic War and know the 
value of peace.”54   
 Brezhnev’s alleged military experience provided his primary claim to legitimacy 
as the leader of the Soviet Union.  According to the logic of the personality cult, 
Brezhnev earned his position (and the adulation it entailed) through fearless service to the 
socialist motherland and the exceptional abilities he displayed therein.  The lessons he 
learned in battle theoretically taught him to be a great leader, one who valued peace, 
international friendship, and the Leninist party line.  But what was the consequence of 
allowing his legitimacy to become so intimately connected to a single persona, to one set 
of supposed accomplishments?  We can assume that this proved detrimental in the long 
run, as the extravagance and pomposity of Brezhnev’s war hero persona increased to the 
point of being simply implausible in the latter years of his reign.  And what, more 
importantly, would the consequences be for the regime as a whole if popular scorn and 
disbelief slowly demolished the leader’s image?
                                                
 54 Pravda, 19 December 1981, no. 353 (23149), 3. 
 
 A Heroic Failure 
 I now turn away from the creation and dissemination of the cult, focusing instead 
on the how the Soviet populace reacted to it.  Unfortunately, public reception is 
notoriously difficult to gauge, especially in the Soviet Union, a society without freedom 
of speech and the press.55  I use Russian-language scholarship and the press from the 
perestroika and post-Soviet periods, as well as Soviet-era jokes, to gauge popular 
sentiment surrounding Brezhnev’s cult of personality.  Offering an impressionistic view 
of public opinion, these sources reflect cynicism and disbelief, in some cases even 
bitterness, strongly suggesting that the Soviet people did not regard Brezhnev as a great 
and legitimate leader.  While opinions of Brezhnev may have broadly been neutral or 
even positive a the beginning of his era, people began to recognize the massive 
incongruities between reality and rhetoric, which grew as Brezhnev’s health declined.  
Rather than revering him, many Soviet citizens pitied and ridiculed the aging General 
                                                
 55 Some scholars have tried to investigate popular opinion through surveillance records (svodki or 
public mood reports) compiled by state officials.  Sarah Davies, one of the first scholars to access svodki 
after Russian archives began to open, uses these sources to gauge popular opinion under Stalin.  Sarah 
Davies, Popular Opinion in Stalin’s Russia: Terror, Propaganda, and Dissent, 1934-1941 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1997).  Soviet-trained historian Elena Zubkova uses svodki to access popular 
sentiments in the postwar period.  Elena Zubkova, Russia After the War: Hopes, Illusions, 
Disappointments, 1945-57, translated by Hugh Ragsdale (Armonk: M.E. Sharp, 1998).  While these studies 
have yielded interesting results, such documents are filtered through the lens of the observer. Lynne Viola 
condenses and elaborates upon Sarah Davies’s discussion of the weaknesses of svodki as a source for 
investigating popular resistance to the regime.  In the broadest terms, the “Stalinist source lens” renders 
these documents problematic, as they are “standardized forms,” which are “structured from the center.” In 
other words, dissenting and official discourses operate not only in tandem, but together, which means that 
we may not be able to draw authentic transcripts of resistance from official sources.  Lynne Viola, “Popular 
Resistance in the Stalinist 1930s: Soliloquy of the Devil’s Advocate,” Kritika 1, no. 1 (Winter 2000): 56-
57.  Regardless of their problematic nature, I do not have access to svodki for the Brezhnev years. 
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Secretary.  The war hero persona, a critical unifying element of Brezhnev’s public image, 
proved a favorite target for vicious tongues.  This doomed the cult of personality. 
 Before proceeding, it is possible to make some inferences as to why the cult 
would have failed with the public, particularly in regard to Brezhnev’s war hero persona.  
“Dear Leonid Il’ich,” first of all, did not physically fit the war hero aesthetic.  As 
Brezhnev’s cult grew, his health declined, leaving the public to witness the increasing 
glorification of things a sick old man allegedly did when he was young and able.56  His 
widely scoffed-at public gaffs, including reading the wrong speech to an official 
reception in Baku, also made many perceive him as dim-witted, another un-heroic trait.57  
Although not the only Soviet leader to experience physical and mental decline in office, 
the spread of technology put Brezhnev at a distinct disadvantage.  Unlike Lenin or Stalin, 
whose illnesses were hidden from public view, television broadcast Brezhnev’s slow 
decay directly into Soviet homes.  Despite the Central Committees efforts to “hide the 
obvious,” Dmitrii Volkogonov asserts, “the whole country, indeed the whole world, knew 
of Brezhnev’s illnesses.”58  This state of affairs led the public not only to ridicule the 
leader, but also to pity him.  “He is so old and sick,” one elderly citizen sighed, “and they 
                                                
 56 Stephen Hanson makes a related claim: “the Brezhnev elite at the turn of the decade faced a 
whole series of new challenges on the international arena . . . [which] simultaneously undermined the 
USSR's international prestige in the Third World, in Europe and in the United States, at a time when the 
CPSU leadership as a whole was far too old and sick to respond with any vigour or creativity.”  Hanson, 
“The Brezhnev Era,” 311. 
 
 57  Here is an example of a joke featuring a stupid Brezhnev: “After the successful Apollo-Soyuz 
space flight, Leonid Brezhnev called to congratulate the cosmonauts, but he also reproached them with: 
‘The Americans are winning the space race!  We must accomplish something to outdo them.  They’ve 
already landed on the moon, so we in the Politburo have decided to send you for a landing on the sun.’  The 
cosmonauts groaned: ‘But comrade Brezhnev, we’ll be burned alive!’  ‘What do you think,’ interrupted 
Brezhnev, ‘that we don’t understand anything?  Don’t worry, we’ve already planned all the details.  First of 
all, you are going to complete the landing at night!’”  Emil Draitser, ed., Forbidden Laughter: Soviet 
Underground Jokes, translated by Jon Pariser (Los Angeles: Almanac, 1978), 56. 
 
 58 Volkogonov, Sem’ vozhdei, 76. 
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still force him to work.”59  Unfortunately, the personality cult aimed to legitimize the 
leader, not foster sympathy for him.  
 The matter of Brezhnev’s medals is another area in which there existed a tenuous 
relationship between reality and image, as the General Secretary received the vast 
majority of his awards and titles years after the end of the war.  By the time of his death, 
Brezhnev had amassed more medals even than the most prominent veteran officers.60  
Increasingly suspicious of Brezhnev’s awards and the concomitant inflation of the Battle 
of Novorossiisk (also known as Malaia zemlia or Little Land)–the previously obscure 
skirmish in which Brezhnev had allegedly experienced combat–Soviet citizens needed 
little impetus to poke fun at the General Secretary.  According to Nina Tumarkin, reading 
aloud from the leader’s war memoir, Little Land, was enough to send some young people 
into fits of laughter.61 Brezhnev’s “passion for awards” also had a more sinister side.  The 
repression of the Brezhnev era extended not only to dissidents, but likewise to those who 
challenged Brezhnev’s war hero status.  Marshal Grigorii Konstantinovich Zhukov, the 
most celebrated Soviet hero of the Second World War, suffered a long period of official 
disgrace, which some veterans believe to have been the result of the General Secretary’s 
jealousy.62   
                                                
 59 Roy Medvedev quotes this woman, identified only as an “elderly female worker,” in “Fars s 
primes’iu tragedii,” in Aksiutin, ed., Materialy k biografii (see note 14), 124. 
 
 60 Stephen Kotkin makes this observation in Armageddon Averted: The Soviet Collapse, 1970-
2000 (Oxford & New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 50. 
 
 61 Tumarkin, The Living and the Dead, 156. 
 
 62 Marshal I. Kh. Bagramian put forth this idea in a 1999 interview.  See Aleksandr Kuchkov, 
“Marshal pobedy. Opala, ili 20 let spustia,” Krasnaia zvezda, 23 October 1999.  
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 The ever more glossy and overblown cult of the war itself proved to be a liability 
for Brezhnev’s image. Reaching its apogee under Brezhnev, Tumarkin maintains, “the 
cult of the Great Patriotic War . . . backfired, inspiring a callous derision on the part of 
many youths,” not to mention veterans.63  While youth may have resented the sanitized, 
ubiquitous war narrative, veterans may have been offended by the abuses of the awards 
system that allowed men like Brezhnev to receive medals essentially as birthday presents.  
Building on Tumarkin’s argument, film scholar Denise J. Youngblood illustrates the 
decline of the war cult by discussing responses to Brezhnev-era movies.  Film industry 
officials tried to push the “master narrative” of World War II on audiences but, as 
Youngblood asserts, the public did not cooperate.  Rather than flocking to battle epics 
like Liberation (commissioned for Victory Day 1970), Soviet moviegoers chose less 
bombastic war films or, even more frequently, comedies and “sentimental” pictures.64  As 
Amir Weiner asserts, it may be too early to “sign a death warrant for the cult of the war,” 
which appears to be alive in Russia today, but it is clear that, in the second half of the 
1970s, mounting cynicism about the state’s use of the war myth damaged Brezhnev’s 
image.  He made himself the focal point of the war cult and suffered the consequences.65 
 Perestroika-era and early post-Soviet Russian scholarship may also offer insights 
on the reasons for the cult’s failure.  In these texts, we find the basis for the “classic” 
                                                
 63 Tumarkin, The Living and the Dead, 157. 
 
 64 Youngblood, Russian War Films, 158-93. 
 
 65 Weiner writes, “Even today historians should not rush to sign a death warrant for the cult of the 
war.  Not only has the date and sites of commemoration sponsored by newly independent states remained 
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Brezhnev most familiar to Westerners today, a conservative incompetent who ushered in 
the “age of stagnation.”  The most prominent of the scholarly works are Roy Medvedev’s 
Lichnost’ i epokha: politicheskii portret L.I. Brezhneva (The Personality and the Era: A 
Political Portrait of L.I. Brezhnev) and Dmitrii Volkogonov’s Sem’ vozhdei (Seven 
Leaders).66  Both historians set about overturning the cult of personality, deflating the 
myths surrounding Brezhnev, and blaming his rule for the sorry state of the Soviet Union 
in the late 1980s.  Describing Brezhnev’s wartime service, Volkogonov and Medvedev 
make clear that he was not the fearless war hero he claimed to be.67  In fact, Brezhnev 
may have never seen battle.  Medvedev quotes one veteran: “I only found out that 
[Brezhnev] was our political officer in 1957.”68  Similarly, tracing the evolution of the 
myth of Brezhnev’s wartime service, historian Nikolai Kirsanov states, “For some 
unclear reason, the war biography of L.I. Brezhnev became the object of unrestrained 
exaltation, even direct falsification in the history of the Great Patriotic War.”69 
 For many Soviet citizens, the personality cult failed.  Brezhnev did not earn their 
respect as a leader; they saw through the façade of legitimacy, medals and all.  In general, 
however, it is difficult to draw from the attitudes of scholars a sample “representative” of 
the populace as a whole. During perestroika specifically, it was imperative for reformers 
                                                
 66 For Volkogonov, see note 5; Roy Medvedev, Lichnost’ i epokha: Politicheskii portret L.I. 
Brezhneva, volume 1 (Moscow: Novosti, 1991). 
 
 67 Volkogonov, Sem’ vozhdei, 17-19 and Medvedev, Lichnost’ i epokha, 31-50.  Recent Russian-
language publications often neglect to be critical of the narrative offered by Malaia zemlia.  In reference to 
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and their supporters to place blame for economic and social problems on their more 
conservative predecessors.  These individuals had a big stake in making it appear as 
though “stagnation” in the economy and the ranks of the leadership, rather than their own 
reforms, were the root causes of contemporary problems.  Mikhail Gorbachev himself 
was one of the first to use the term “stagnation” (zastoi) to describe the Brezhnev era, 
while certain reforms, such as the 1988 overhaul of the state awards system, were aimed 
specifically at breaking down the traditions of Brezhnev-era elites, in this case the abuse 
of titles and medals, which were given out as favors, gifts, or meaningless symbols of 
prestige, rather than in return for service to the state.70  In this vein, Novosti Press 
published a collection of abridged newspaper articles, meant to offer insights into the 
failings of the Brezhnev years.  Including articles by respected dissident historian Roy 
Medvedev and Brezhnev’s grandson, Andrei Brezhnev, this work proved to be one of 
many efforts to destroy any positive impressions the public may have harbored about the 
deceased leader.  Tellingly, the volume is entitled Leonid Brezhnev: The Period of 
Stagnation, An Unbiased Analysis of the Negative Experience of Leonid Brezhnev’s 18-
year Leadership (1964-1982) Today Helps us Find Correct Solutions to Questions Put 
[sic] by Perestroika.71  While it is outside the scope of my paper to discuss whether or 
not their views on the economic and social decline of the Soviet Union are accurate, we 
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can assume that the attitudes of the educated classes may not have been exactly the same 
as those held by common people, such as factory workers, farmers, or the urban poor.72 
 It is possible, however, to access some measure of the popular reception of 
Brezhnev’s cult of personality through other means.  Jokes are one form of popular 
discourse that thrived during the Soviet era (and exist today in printed form), in spite of 
state restrictions on speech and the press.  Often considered a form of folklore, the 
anekdot is an oral tradition found throughout Russian history.  The telling of anekdoty is 
more akin to a process of culture-formation and, in some cases, as an act of political and 
social rebellion, than Western conceptions of humor would lead one to expect.  
Anekdoty, moreover, took on special significance in the Soviet period.  As Seth Graham 
argues, “At its peak, the anekdot enjoyed the status of a carnivalesque genre-laureate in 
the organic hierarchy of popular discursive forms that had developed with the state-
prescribed Ars poetica.”  This “genre-laureate,” moreover, was preeminent thanks to “its 
capacity to outflank, mimic, debunk, deconstruct, and otherwise critically engage with 
other genres and texts of all stripes and at all presumed points on the spectrum from 
resistance to complicity (or from official to unofficial).”73  In other words, the anekdot 
thrived because it gave people a relatively safe outlet for their frustrations with the Soviet 
state and society.   
                                                
 72 Some new scholarship points to the inaccuracies that underpinned Gorbachev’s anti-Brezhnev 
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 The Brezhnev years witnessed the heyday of the anekdot, thanks in part to the 
bombastic and ridiculous nature of the leader’s public persona.  As A.V. Trubnikov, one 
of the interviewees in Donald J. Raleigh’s Russia’s Sputnik Generation asserts, 
“Attitudes toward Brezhnev were expressed in jokes that circulated about him.  The 
number of anecdotes is enormous. . . .  That is, he wasn’t taken seriously.  People didn’t 
relate to him as a leader, Lord forbid, there was nothing but jokes at his expense.”74  
Anekdoty about Brezhnev are wide-ranging in their subject matter, from Brezhnev’s love 
of luxury to his luxurious eyebrows, but I focus here on recurring themes that are of 
particular relevance to my study.  I examine eleven collections of jokes: three in English 
and six in Russian, as well as two bilingual volumes.75   Comprised of about forty-five 
jokes, my sample offers an impressionistic view of this oral tradition as it existed in the 
late 1970s.  Nearly half of these anekdoty poked fun at Brezhnev’s alleged war service or 
his love of medals, while his mental competence appears as the second most popular 
topic.  Other targets include Brezhnev’s poor health and his vanity.  The majority of the 
jokes cited here appeared in two or more of these collections, as I take the frequency of 
their appearance to indicate, to some extent, their popularity.   
 First, the anekdoty mocking Brezhnev’s intellect (or, rather, lack thereof) point to 
the fact that many Soviet citizens detected the leader’s un-heroic characteristics.  One 
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popular anekdot features Brezhnev’s seeming inability to make any public statement 
without a script: 
There is a knock at Brezhnev’s door.  He takes out a stack of papers, finds 
the one he needs, walks to the door and reads: “Who’s there?”76 
 
Brezhnev’s reputation for doltishness appears to have even rubbed off on established 
popular war heroes.  As Bruce Adams notes, anekdoty about the Civil War hero Vasilii 
Ivanovich Chapaev emerged and flourished during the 1970s.  Previously a beloved 
figure in Soviet culture, during the Brezhnev years Chapaev became the butt of countless 
jokes, most of which mocked his intellect and depicted him as “a heavy-drinking, 
uncultured boob with a foul mouth, a larcenous heart, and uncertain loyalties.”77  In one 
Chapaev anekdot we even find an oblique reference to the General Secretary: 
“Vasily Ivanovich, can you drink a liter?” 
“I can.” 
“Two?” 
“I can.” 
“A whole bucket?” 
“No. . . . Only Ilich can do that.”78 
 
This one anekdot offers several layers of meaning.  On the surface, it features routine 
desacralization of a beloved hero, Chapaev, a process that Adams argues was spurred on 
by “the excesses of Brezhnevite propaganda.”79  Beyond this, we have an ambiguous 
reference to the leader.  Is the jokester indicating Vladimir Il’ich Lenin or Leonid Il’ich 
Brezhnev?  Since Lenin famously abstained from alcohol, the listener can safely assume 
that the barb is aimed at Brezhnev.  Such deliberate ambiguity, however, still turns the 
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expression into a meta-anekdot by forging a connection with another canonical joke, 
which lampoons Brezhnev’s lust for power:80 
“Comrade Brezhnev, you’ve become the General Secretary.  What do you 
want to be called now?” 
“Just call me Il’ich.”81 
 
 Connected to Brezhnev’s alleged stupidity is a family of anekdoty that cast doubt 
on the authorship of Brezhnev’s “autobiographies.”  These jokes often highlight 
widespread knowledge–or, at least, suspicion–that these books, including Little Land, 
were ghostwritten.  For example: 
Brezhnev asks Suslov: “Have you read Little Land?” 
Suslov: “Yes, I read it twice.  I liked it a lot.” 
Brezhnev replies happily: “Oh, I still need to read it.”82 
 
 The 1970s in particular also saw an avalanche of jokes directly mocking 
Brezhnev’s war hero image.  After Brezhnev became a Marshal of the Soviet Union, for 
example, people began to quip that it was because he “managed to take the Kremlin.”83  
One nasty little rhyme (part of a genre called chastushki) also poked fun at his Marshal 
status.  I present it here in Russian transliteration as well as in English, since translation 
destroys the rhyme scheme: 
Maskaradnyi marshal Brezhnev Fake marshal Brezhnev 
Sobiraet ordena.   Collects medals. 
Sobiraet ordena,   Collects medals, 
A sam ne stoit ni khrena.    And he still isn’t worth shit.84 
                                                
 80 Seth Graham offers a thorough discussion of meta-anekdoty in Seth Graham, “Varieties of 
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We find yet another example of the widespread mockery of Brezhnev’s “passion for 
awards” in one classic question and response style joke: 
 “What did Brezhnev die from?” 
 “We don’t know exactly, but just before death he was crapping medals.”85 
 
 Such satire reflects more than the Soviet people’s love of scathing political 
humor, also pointing to a more serious matter: the desacralization of the leadership. 
Indeed, these anekdoty may have constituted a major component of the process of 
desacralization, being not only symptomatic of the public’s political disaffection, but 
likewise feeding it.  Writing about underground literature on the eve of the French 
Revolution, Robert Darnton asserts that the authors of these works “had directed a new 
cultural power against the orthodoxies of the old.”86  In the Soviet Union of the Brezhnev 
era, jokes played this role, as common people sitting in their kitchens participated in the 
creation of a discourse that challenged official ideas and narratives.  This is strikingly 
similar to the waves of desacralization that swept away the ancien regime in France and 
Russia’s Romanov dynasty.87  In the Soviet case, however, jokes played, at least in part, 
the role that pornography, libelous pamphlets, and rumor had in France and Imperial 
Russia.88  Anekdoty tore down the leader’s façade and built a new image in its place, 
replacing Brezhnev the War Hero with Brezhnev the Sickly Dolt. 
                                                                                                                                            
 
 85 Shturman and Tiktin, Sovetskii Soiuz, 275.  Also see epigraph. 
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 Earlier eras had certainly produced their share of political anekdoty, but during 
the Brezhnev period the character of this underground humor began to change.  
Previously sacrosanct events, such as the October Revolution, and the Civil War, 
increasingly became fodder for jokes.89  Beyond these topics, many Brezhnev-era jokes 
also expressed bitterness about Soviet rule in general.  One joke asks: “What hopes do we 
have for 1982?”  The answer: “Soviet power turns sixty-five.  Maybe it will retire.”90  
Finally, the anekdot’s status at this time as a “ubiquitous form of discourse” points to the 
process of desacralization.  Previously, political humor had meant the possibility of 
denunciation and imprisonment; however, as A.V. Trubnikov asserts, “No one was afraid 
of [Brezhnev].  People told these jokes about him and no one was imprisoned for doing 
do.  At work you could quietly tell jokes about Leonid Ilich and no one would inform on 
you, no one would come after you, even though there was a system of informants in the 
Soviet Union.”91  Many Soviet citizens even joked about the possibility of being 
imprisoned for swapping anekdoty: 
 At a meeting Brezhnev and President Nixon start a conversation 
about their pastimes:   
 Nixon asks, “Do you have any hobbies, Mr. Brezhnev?” 
 “Oh, yes!” Brezhnev exclaims, “I collect jokes about myself.” 
 Nixon, surprised by this strange hobby, inquires further: “And 
have you collected many?”   
 Brezhnev responds, “I have three camps full!”92 
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As such anekdoty suggest, the “period of stagnation” may have seen the beginning of a 
process of desacralization that impacted more than the image of the General Secretary. 
 While aiming to legitimize Brezhnev’s power and to broadcast an ideal image of 
the leader, the cult of personality backfired.  Over the course of the 1970s, the Soviet 
people came to pity the physical wreck that the General Secretary had become and sneer 
at the overblown glorification of his abilities and accomplishments. The myth of 
Brezhnev’s military successes had offered support to his other hero roles, drawing on 
tropes from the Russian and Soviet past, also giving him a place in the mythologized 
narrative of the Great Patriotic War. The incongruities between reality and official 
fiction, however, proved too great to be overcome by parades, pamphlets, and blatant 
distortions of the historical record.  After Gorbachev began his process of reform, another 
set of voices emerged as scholars began to form a master narrative of the sixties, 
seventies, and eighties that pinned blame for the USSR’s economic and social problems 
on Brezhnev-era stagnation.  Obvious disconnections between reality and rhetoric, a 
profusion of scathing anekdoty, and the perestroika-era stagnation thesis all indicate not 
only that the cult of personality failed, but also that this failure resulted largely from the 
absurdity of Brezhnev’s war hero persona
Failure, Collapse, and Nostalgia 
 Some people began joking about Brezhnev’s death years before it actually 
happened.  “Brezhnev died,” many quipped, “but his body lives on.”93  Coupled with 
obvious physical deterioration, the General Secretary’s longwinded speeches and 
numerous public gaffs fed into an image of illness and incompetence, transforming him 
into a living caricature.  The fact that nearly a decade stretched between Brezhnev’s 1974 
stroke and his death in 1982 may have exacerbated this impression; he proved 
increasingly feeble, yet inexplicably eternal.  Over time, “Dear Leonid Il’ich” became 
something of a symbol for the Soviet Union of the late 1970s.  The leader’s seemingly 
endless decline reflected the condition of his state: sick and stagnant.  In both cases, it 
appears that many people were somehow prepared for the end, even if they felt it may 
never come.94  
 The collapse of Brezhnev’s cult of personality demonstrates how one of the most 
deeply embedded characteristics of Soviet political culture could become a major weak 
spot for the state.  Shrouding the leader in fiction and mythologizing his deeds proved 
effective in establishing regime legitimacy throughout much of Soviet history.  Under 
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Brezhnev, however, we see what can happen if the personality cult fails.  Discussing the 
1917 fall of Alexander Kerensky, Figes and Kolonitskii remind us that “the cult of the 
leader had its disadvantages,” namely, he “would take the blame for the mistakes of the 
government.”95  Similarly, one might argue that, by intertwining the his legitimacy with 
that of the state, the personality cult encourages the populace to blame the entire 
government for the mistakes of its leader.  Keeping this in mind while looking at the 
growing cynicism of the “era of stagnation,” we can infer that the failure of Brezhnev’s 
cult of personality negatively impacted the legitimacy of the Soviet system as a whole.   
 Could the collapse of the cult of Brezhnev have, in fact, played a role in the 
collapse of the state?  Focusing mainly on the Gorbachev era, several scholars suggest 
that the disillusionment of the masses contributed to the USSR’s demise. But what if we 
take this back further? 96  As the failure of Brezhnev’s cult illustrates, the Soviet public 
had already ceased to take the leadership’s rhetoric seriously, at least in part, by the latter 
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half of 1970s.  To use Machiavelli’s words, it appears that public opinion had ceased to 
be “reinforced by the authority of the state,” having instead rejected this authority and its 
representatives.  Furthermore, Brezhnev, through his very public descent into infirmity, 
became a sad figurehead for the regime, the embodiment of stagnation; this dealt a heavy 
blow to state legitimacy.  The heroes of the revolution were long dead, and the leader 
who cast himself as a hero of the Great Patriotic War became a laughingstock.   
 Looking back to the 1950s, we see the beginning of the story of de-legitimization 
to which Brezhnev added a new chapter.  Khrushchev’s denunciation of Stalin at the 
Twentieth Party Congress in 1956 opened up the regime to internal and external 
judgment.  In the following months,  “at numerous meetings were the speech was read 
and discussed, criticism of the party exploded way beyond Khrushchev’s.”97  This was 
further encouraged by the dismantling of the terror apparatus and the easing of censorship 
in the press, as the new political climate allowed “a nascent civil society to form where 
Stalinism had created a desert.”98  During these years, however, the leadership 
disappointed many hopes that they may have raised.  Khrushchev’s social and political 
reforms proved halting and incomplete, while his prophecies about the progress of the 
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Soviet state, particularly its march toward communism, went unfulfilled.99  The emerging 
“civil society” often proved to be critical of the state. 
 Over the ensuing decades, the government tried to curtail this phenomenon, but to 
no avail.  By the mid-1970s, a small but active dissident movement had firmly been 
established and many of those who did not dissent slipped into political apathy.100  For 
numerous Soviet citizens, the regime had become something to either oppose or ignore; 
an object of satire, but not of fear.  The Soviet public had been stripped of its hopes for 
real reform and had ceased to harbor any intense fear of the regime.  Under Brezhnev, the 
Soviet myth economy ran out of ideas to bolster its leaders and reverse popular 
disappointment; the personality cult failed, but political tradition was hard pressed to 
produce another method for legitimating authority.  Through a process of desacralization 
analogous to that of the late tsarist era, a combination of popular discontent and faltering 
ideology hamstrung the USSR.  People were already fed up with want, despair, and 
empty promises by the time Gorbachev came to power.  It may have already been too late 
to revive the Soviet project. 
 But this does not mean that “Dear Leonid Il’ich” was doomed to obscurity.  In 
September 2004, officials in Novorossiisk–the site of the Battle of Malaia Zemlia–
unveiled a two-meter tall, bronze statue of the deceased General Secretary.  The 
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monument features a “healthy, strong” man on the verge of gracious middle age, a 
dramatically different figure than the Brezhnev lampooned in the anekdoty of the 
1970s.101  Recent years have also seen the publication of several biographies that offer a 
much rosier view of the man and his era than was presented in glasnost’-era scholarship.  
These new authors portray Brezhnev as deeply human, a simple but capable man, 
devoted to his country and its cause.102  A few Western historians even suggest that 
Brezhnev has, more than two decades after his death, become the most popular leader in 
modern Russian history.103   
 In order to understand nostalgia for the Brezhnev era, we must remember that the 
“period of stagnation” also offered unparalleled international prestige, the Olympics in 
Moscow, job stability, vacation time, and shoddy-but-obtainable consumer goods.  When 
compared to years of war, terrorism, corruption, and economic upheaval that followed the 
demise of the Soviet Union, the Brezhnev period may appear to many to have been a 
“golden age” of sorts.  Other post-Soviet cultural and political factors may have also 
encouraged this nostalgia.  Svetlana Boym maintains that “the old Soviet movies that 
reappeared on Russian TV” in the 1990s spurred a wave of warm feelings for the 
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1970s.104  Looking at early twenty-first century, we might also point to President 
Vladimir Putin’s revival of elements from the Soviet past, such as the reintroduction of 
the old national anthem,  as a catalyst for nostalgia.  As Boym reminds us, however, 
wistful longing for the past does not necessarily connect an individual or a society to the 
reality of their history.  “Nostalgic reconstructions,” she argues, “are based on mimicry; 
the past is remade in the image of the present or a desired future, collective designs are 
made to resemble personal aspirations and vice versa.”105  Perhaps, then, the next task is 
to deconstruct the nostalgic Brezhnev, not as a means of understanding a legacy or 
vestige of the past, but rather to uncover the desires that some Russians harbor for their 
present and their future.
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